Iraqi weapons of mass destruction

The claim, in its accurate form: the stockpiles and mobile production labs presented as established fact in 2002-03 did not exist, and parts of the case were known internally to be thin or contested at the time.

Weapons inspectors found no stockpiles after the invasion. The 2004 Senate Intelligence Committee report, the Iraq Survey Group's Duelfer report, the 2005 Robb-Silberman commission and the UK's 2016 Chilcot inquiry each examined how the case was built.

Paraphrased summaries of publicly circulating reports, not verbatim quotes from identified individuals. Unverified by definition.

• “An intelligence analyst described watching a single defector's reporting harden from caveated to certain as it moved upward, and being unable to reattach the caveats.”

  mixedReported 2004

  Paraphrased from published interviews and inquiry testimony

Confirmed in outline. The Duelfer report found no stockpiles and no active programme. The mobile-lab claim traced substantially to a single defector, codenamed Curveball, whose reporting German intelligence had flagged as unreliable and who later admitted fabricating. Chilcot concluded the UK presented the threat with a certainty the intelligence did not justify. Where inquiries stopped short is on intent: they documented pressure, selective use and institutional failure, and did not establish that officials knew the weapons were absent — a distinction the strongest versions of the claim ignore.